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Built on Lies: Preliminary Reflections on
Evidence Law as an Autopoietic System
by
RICHARD 0. LEMPERT*

Introduction
This Symposium on Truth and Its Rivals seems most concerned
with what one might think of as the "output" side of evidence lawthat is, whether the rules of evidence enhance the likelihood that trial
verdicts will capture the true state of the matter giving rise to the litigation. From this perspective, the legitimate rivals to truth are values
that may justify decisions that eclipse the truth. The most obvious examples are rules of privilege, which allow probative information to
remain concealed even where it is essential to accurate fact finding.
My focus is different. I look not at implications of evidentiary
rules for outputs, but at the lies that are at the very heart of our evidentiary system. My thesis is that our system of evidentiary rules, including the common law, statutes, and constitutional elements, works
in part because it often falsely portrays reality. It does so because distorting factual reality allows for reasonableness and consistency at a
conceptual level as well as, in many cases, a superior output, in other
words, greater verdict accuracy. Although stating that our system of
evidence law rests, in part, on lies is not necessarily to condemn it, the
situation is not a healthy one. The system's legitimacy is threatened
when the spotlight is cast on the lies at its core. Thus, the attention
that social scientists are now giving evidence rules is not entirely a
good thing from the system's point of view, because science can undercut the claimed factual basis of an evidentiary rule without offering a substitute basis that articulates well with other evidentiary rules,
is politically feasible, and promotes verdict accuracy.
Evidence Law as an Autopoietic System
Evidence law can rest on unreal assumptions about the world because the set of evidentiary rules and the cases that justify them are
an autopoietic system in the sense that the German sociologist Niklas
Luhmann uses the term. An autopoietic system, as described by
* Frances A. Allen Collegiate Professor of Law, Professor of Sociology, & Chair,
Department of Sociology, The University of Michigan.
1. See generally Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, in AuTOPOIETIC
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Luhmann, is a system of communication that is recursive, selfreferential, self-producing, self-reproducing, self-observing, and selfdescribing. To put this in more folksy language, it is a system that
talks to itself, about itself, and in its own terms. An autopoietic system is also bounded or closed. It can observe the world external to it,
but it does not directly respond to it. Rather it responds to a representation of the world modeled in the system's own terms. In an earlier piece I have called this "the as if world of evidence law.",2 Evidence law, in other words, does not respond to the realities of the
actual world, rather it responds to the supposed realities of a world it
has established and modeled as if it were the actual world.
Evidence law's world is in large measure congruent with the actual world, but the model has been built up over time. Parts of it correspond to the way the actual world appeared generations ago, and
parts of it correspond to worlds that anyone except a court would always have regarded as fictive. The hearsay rule, for example, in large
measure reflects a world in which the threat that hearsay poses to the
truth rests to a considerable extent on the fact that hearsay statements
are not given under oath.3 This underpinning remains conceptually
important even though in today's world the lack of an oath may be
the least important reason to suspect the accuracy of most hearsay.
Thus the presumed capacity of excitement to still tendencies to lie
and thus substitute for an oath continues to justify an exception for
excited utterances, although the consensus of the past half century is
that the cost of excitement in terms of less accurate perception exceeds the benefit of presumably increased sincerity.' Similarly, on the
one hand, the hearsay rule continues to rest in part on the factfinder's

LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 12 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988) [hereinafter AUOTPOIETIC LAW]; Niklas Luhmann, Closure and Openness: On Reality in the

World of Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra, at 335. For an excellent article about the
developments in Luhmann's theory since 1988, see Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the
"Relative Autonomy" of Law, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987 (1998). For present purposes I
mean simply to assert rather than defend the proposition that the set of evidence rules and
cases form an autopoietic system, although in what follows I shall show certain respects in
which evidence law behaves autopoietically. I hope in a later work to return to this theme
and more rigorously demonstrate the autopoiesis of evidence law.
2. See Richard Lempert, Of Flutes, Oboes and the "as if' World of Evidence Law. 1
INT'LJ. EVIDENCE & PROOF 316 (1997).
3. See SIR GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 3-4 (1754). For a general

discussion of the development of rationales for the hearsay rule and the way they changed
over time, see Stephan Landsman, From Gilbert to Bentham: The Reconceptualizationof
Evidence Theory, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1149 (1990).
4. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
5. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to the Logical Structure of Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1069. 1091
n.213 (1992).
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inability to evaluate the demeanor of absent speakers.' On the other
hand, little is made of the danger that hearsay will be misreported because witnesses to hearsay may be cross-examined like other witnesses, and cross-examination is presumed to be an effective device
for revealing testimonial inaccuracies. But the likely effectiveness of
cross-examination in getting at the truth is seldom examined-numerous court opinions and commentaries rely on Wigmore's conclusion that cross-examination is "beyond any doubt the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"7 rather than on empirical evidence. In particular, in the hearsay context, courts ignore
ways in which cross-examining witnesses about a few lines of speech
they heard differs from cross-examining witnesses about more complex perceptions, like descriptions of accidents, and so makes the discovery of erroneous or dishonest reporting less likely when all a witness has testified to is having heard a particular statement.8 Rather,
evidence law treats its construction of the world, here a construction
which sees cross-examination as an effective means for revealing misreported hearsay, as if it were the reality in which decisions about the
creation and meanings of rules have their effects.
This does not mean evidence law is necessarily bound to past
views of reality. Evidence law's world model, like the real world, is
not stable. Rather it is an ongoing, self-referential, communicative
representation of reality which incorporates and builds on past representations and, often self-consciously, provides building blocks for
imagined future representations.
The motivation for changing evidence law's self-created world
view has historically been the legal case, an extra-systemic influence
which, in Luhmann's terms, while being entirely external to the legal
system, can nonetheless act as an "irritant" to it. The case is a matter
the system must deal with, an itch that must be scratched. Usually the
irritation is minor, and the treatment is as routine and automatic as
responses to most itches are-the unreflective scratch. Thus for evidence law's normal itches-the routine case-clear rules or precedents allow most issues of procedure and admissibility to be resolved
quickly. But in some situations, the "irritation" a case poses is too
great or novel, and neither code nor precedent supplies a balm. In
these circumstances, evidence law's world model may change so that
6. Professor Wellborn, drawing on modem social science research, has persuasively
questioned the value of this cue. See generally Olin Guy Wellborn, III, Demeanor, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1991).

7. 5
1974).
8.

JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §

See

RICHARD

0.

LEMPERT

&

APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 353 (2d ed. 1982).

STEPHEN

A.

1367 (Chadbourn Rev.

SALTZBURG,

A

MODERN

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49

existing precedent can put down the itch, or the case may be incorporated into the system as a new event and a new precedent, or, even, a
new code provision may arise to meet it. There is, however, a difference in these solutions. Where a new precedent is created, it will
build on and perhaps change the suppositions that shape the world as
evidence law conceives it. New code provisions may do the same
thing, or they may, as with the recent enactment of Federal Rules of
Evidence ("FRE") 413 through 415,' reflect the world view of a different system-here the political system-that can impose itself on
evidence law by brute force.
Examples of Fictional Worlds
But enough abstraction and metaphor. Let me provide concrete
examples of what I mean. Consider the case of Ohio v. Roberts,"'
which despite the majority's disclaimer seemed, when it was handed
down, to have the potential to reshape a large segment of evidence
law." Roberts applied to Confrontation Clause jurisprudence the
same general thinking that gave us the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule,12 namely the idea that necessity and reliability together justify the admission of hearsay. 3 For constitutional purposes Roberts
also accepted the negative pregnant here: without reliability and necessity, the Confrontation Clause prohibits hearsay. Thus, Roberts
seemed to hold that hearsay could not be admitted against a criminal
defendant without violating the defendant's Confrontation Clause
rights unless the speaker's unavailability was established and the state
could show some special reason to believe the speaker's hearsay was
reliable. The burden potentially imposed by this second prong was,
however, eased considerably by the Court's pronouncement that reliability could be inferred, without more, if the hearsay met the requirements of a long established exception to the hearsay rule. 4
The first prong of the Robert's test was a fair representation of
the actual world. Hearsay is only necessary to prove a point when the
speaker of the hearsay cannot testify as a witness."' Yet it was obvi-

9. FED. R. EvID. 413-15 (relating to evidence admissible in sexual assault and child
molestation civil and criminal cases).
10.

448 U.S. 56 (1980).

11. See id. at 64-65.
12. Originally these were exceptions FRE 803(24) and FRE 804(b)(5). See FED. R.
EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). Today there is a single catch-all exception. See FED. R. EvID.
807.
13. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
14. See id. at 66.
15. With the conspicuous exception of hearsay enshrined in business and official records. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6)-(8).
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ous when Roberts came down that the necessity prong could not stand
because it potentially excluded too much hearsay (excited utterances,
states of mind, statements for medical treatment, etc.) that had long
been admitted regardless of the speaker's availability.! In purporting
to exclude such hearsay, Roberts ignored one of the "facts" of evidence law's world view, namely, that some hearsay is likely to convey
more accurate information than the speaker's testimony could provide. This is because a speaker's trial testimony has a higher risk of
suffering from memory and sincerity problems than an earlier out-ofcourt statement on the same topic.
Is this "fact," which rests on a reasonable premise, correct? Not
necessarily, for this argument that hearsay is more credible than testimony ignores possible memory and sincerity problems by the person
reporting the hearsay as well as the reporter's possible mishearing of
what was said. More importantly, in comparing the likely reliability
of the speaker's earlier out-of-court statement with the same statement uttered as testimony, the analysis ignores the value of information about context or other matters that cross-examining the speaker
might reveal. Thus, it may only be the unusual case in which information conveyed by admissible hearsay, such as present sense impressions, excited utterances, then existing states of mind, or statements
for medical diagnosis,' 7 is likely to conduce to more accurate factfinding than the information gained by calling the speaker to the
stand. No matter, as far as evidence law is concerned, the likely value
of substituting a person's testimony for a witness's report of his excited utterance or statement to a physician is low because numerous
cases have, as a matter of fact, proclaimed it to be. Roberts was intolerably inconsistent with this long established view of the world, and
this prong of Roberts was laid to rest by a simple refusal to take seriously what it said. Despite a seemingly clear text, the Court, with the
concurrence of those who profess to believe that the plain meaning of
texts controls, limited the availability prong of Roberts so as to reconfirm its irrelevance to the FRE 803 exceptions and perhaps apply it
only to former testimony among the FRE exceptions that require unavailability.18
If the first prong of Roberts was based on a plausible model of
real
world, and what it means for hearsay to be necessary, the
the
second prong, by which I mean the requirement that hearsay be reliable coupled with the proposition that without more reliability can be
assumed if the out-of-court statement fits a long established hearsay
16.
17.
18.
387,394

See FED. R. EVID. 803(2)-(4).
See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(4).
See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353-54 (1992); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S.
(1986).
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exception, was not. Evidence law's world is the only place where all
hearsay fitting long-established exceptions is especially likely to be
true. In the case of some exceptions, most notably the excited utterance exception, 9 the consensus seems to be that the conditions that
qualify statements for the exception conduce, on balance, to unreliability. The same may be said of the "tender years" exceptions that
some states have created in an effort to make it easier to prove child
abuse. 21 Moreover, even if most admissible hearsay has a special likelihood of being reliable, most exceptions will nevertheless admit some
hearsay which, if it were examined for reliability, would not pass the
Roberts test. But the counter-factual proposition that any hearsay
which meets the conditions of a long-established hearsay exception is
reliable is the prong of Roberts that has been staunchly reaffirmed.2'
Whatever the world may look like to non-judicial observers, the
proposition that hearsay which meets the conditions of a longestablished exception is reliable is not counter-factual in the as if
world that evidence law constructs.
Consider also White v. Illinois, not for its affirmation of the
reading I have just given Roberts, but for what Chief Justice Rhenquist, apparently speaking for a unanimous Court, says with respect
to the case he is deciding. The Chief Justice writes, "a statement
made in the course of procuring medical services, where the declarant
knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment,
carries special guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may not
think replicated by courtroom testimony., 22 This is true in the Court's
world of evidence law. The problem is that in the world where the
case arose the declarant was a four-year-old girl who, after telling her
story to her babysitter, her mother and a police officer, four hours
later told it to a nurse and, even later, to a doctor)3 The alleged sexual assault apparently left no physical injury, and the girl's hearsay
statement simply identified the assailant and purported to describe
what he had done. It would be surprising, indeed I would be astonished, if the four year old thought as she repeated her story for the
fourth and fifth times that on these occasions she had better be accurate because her medical treatment depended on it.
Although I have relied primarily on Supreme Court decisions to
19. See FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
20. For a list of states having such statutes and a discussion of some of the issues they
raise, see generally Robert G. Marks, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?: The Need for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207 (1995).
21. See White, 502 U.S. at 354; Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171. 182-83 (1987).
22. White, 502 U.S. at 356.
23. See id. at 349-50.
24. See id.
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illustrate my points, one does not have to go to the nation's highest
court to view judges creating fictional worlds to justify evidence rulings. Consider impeachment by prior inconsistent statements and the
many courts that have found an inconsistency between a witness's
earlier statement implicating a defendant and her later testimony, "I
don't remember." Only in evidence law's as if world do people not
only not forget anything they ever said, but also mean to deny a defendant's guilt when they say they don't remember what they once
said about him.5
The decision of a D.C. Circuit Court panel in Winfield v. United
State? provides another example of how fictional worlds are invoked
to support evidentiary decisions. In Winfield, a man
was identified by government witnesses as the man who had chased
down and shot the victim to death while saying "do you like
snitching?" The defense offered to prove that on the day of the
murder the victim had informed against a man named Huff, and
that Huff had previously threatened, shot, and stabbed the victim
after a prior instance of informing.27
The Winfield court upheld the trial court's ruling:
Although evidence of a third person's motives, actions, opportunity and statements are of the type which may be used to establish
the requisite link to the crime charged in the case, to be admissible,
the proffered evidence in the aggregate must establish "the necessary link, connection or nexus between the proffered evidence and
the crime at issue." Thus, we have held that a defendant's proffer
of evidence that other individuals had even stronger motives to
murder the victim than the accused was insufficient, without more,
to establish the necessary link to the offense charged to render the
evidence admissible at trial ....
Even threats against the crime victim are not relevant, "unless the
third person is an accomplice or accessory of the accused" or unless
the third person is implicated by other evidence in some way to the
crime charged. 28
Doesn't FRE 401 define as relevant, evidence having any tendency to make a consequential fact more or less probable than it

25. See generally David Greenwald, The Forgetful Witness, 60 U. CHi. L. REV. 167
(1993).
26. 652 A.2d 608 (D.C. 1994) vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 661 A.2d 1094 (D.C.
1995), rev'd 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1996).
27. Donald A. Dripps, Relevant But Prejudicial Exculpatory Evidence: Rationality
Versus Jury Trial and the Right to Put on a Defense, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389,1409 (1996).
28. 65 A.2d at 612-13 (citations omitted). For a thoughtful commentary on this case
and an analysis of what is problematic about this and similar cases, see Dripps, supra note
27.
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would be without the evidence? 9 In no world I know is evidence of
the sort offered in Winfield irrelevant. Yet not only was it irrelevant
in the trial judge's and the panel's world, but they could find precedent for their decision, as other judges had constructed similar worlds
to justify similar rulings."
Finally, consider the artificial worlds that have been created by
courts and legislators to allow the hearsay of children alleged to have
been victimized sexually into evidence.
Excitement in some such
children can endure for hours or even days without being noticeable
until the incriminatory words are spoken; statements in response to
probing or even leading questions can be spontaneous, and as we saw
in White, anything said to a doctor will be true because no matter how
young the child or doubtful a physical injury, the child will know
medical treatment depends on his veracity.
Reasons for Fictional Worlds
The reader may think that I have laid bare these judicial lies to
deplore them. Not at all. The situation is more complex, for courts
can get in trouble when they see the world as it is. Consider Bruton v.
United States.32 Here the Court rejected one of the fictions that evidence law had not only long lived with, but actually thrived upon:
namely, the fiction that juries will follow instructions and consider
evidence only for certain purposes or against particular persons. The
Supreme Court recognized in Bruton that when a defendant's confession implicated himself and a codefendant, a jury would find it difficult if not impossible to follow a judge's instructions to consider the
confession only against its maker. In so holding the Court recognized that most people are unable to rigidly segregate, by issue, information provided them or to control completely its influence on
them. Thus the Court found that Bruton's Confrontation Clause
rights had been violated by the admission of his codefendant's confession at their joint trial.34 Bruton should have been tried separately
from the confessing defendant.
Perhaps because so many crimes are committed with company,3S
Bruton proved impossible to live with, and the Court soon fell back
into its usual ways of finding comfort in worlds it constructed. First,
29. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
30. See e.g., Johnson v. United States, 552 A.2d 513.516-18 (D.C. 1989).
31. See generally Marks, supra note 20.
32. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
33. See id. at 135-36.
34. See id. at 137.
35. In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987), Justice Scalia indicates that
one-third of all federal criminal trials involve joint defendants.
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the Court held in Nelson v. O'Nei36 that there was no Bruton violation when the defendant whose confession was introduced testified in
his own defense because the codefendant could cross-examine the
confessing defendant when he took the stand.37 The Court ignored
the fact that when codefendants are mounting a joint defense, their
cooperative effort will be destroyed if one casts doubt on the other's
credibility, and they ignored the fact that in the very case they were
deciding there was nothing to cross-examine the testifying defendant
on because he denied making the confession that implicated his codefendant. Nineteen years after Bruton, the Court retreated still further, holding in Richardson v. Marsh that separate trials were not the
only means of preventing a Bruton violation.' Redacting one defendant's confession to remove references to another defendant is sufficient. 39 But when Richardson is applied in the real world of criminal
trials, it is unlikely to offer the protection Bruton promised. Although Richardson itself may have been an exception, anything less
than a redaction which destroys the story of a joint enterprise is likely
to leave jurors suspecting that the accomplice referenced in a defendant's confession, however vague and shadowy the reference, is the
person on trial with him. 40
The fate of Roberts provides another example of why courts do
not always want to write opinions that reflect the fair implications of
accepted legal values for evidence rulings in the world we live in. The
first prong of Roberts, that the Confrontation Clause requires a
showing of actual unavailability before hearsay is admitted, seems
necessary to implement the full value of the Confrontation Clause
rights in all situations where jurors would be better informed by a
hearsay declarant's examination and cross-examination than they are
by a listener's report of the hearsay statement. Yet we have long
lived with a system which admits considerable hearsay from available
witnesses and, without more, admits hearsay that falls under traditional exceptions. There is no particular reason to think that, over the
years, this traditional system has been responsible for considerable
injustice. I applaud the values of Roberts and the world of proof it
aspired to. But as a practical matter, Roberts was an irresponsible decision, changing as it did, in one quick and unthinking stroke, so much

36. 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
37. See iL at 629.
38. See 481 U.S. at 208-09.
39. See id.
40. Since this was written, the Supreme Court seems to have taken the point of view
of the text and mandated the elimination of references that directly but anonymously
point to the defendant. See Gray v. Maryland, 118 S.Ct. 1151 (1998). The case does not go
so far, however, as to destroy the story of the joint enterprise. See id.
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of our received culture of hearsay law. Thus, the Court was right to
retreat into its as if world to contain the damage to long received tradition that Roberts might have wrought, as well as, in the real world,
to avoid the extra expenses Roberts would have imposed and the disputes that would have arisen over issues of availability.
It is no accident that courts have created a system of evidence
rules that seem ill-suited to the world in which they operate, or that
courts create fictional worlds to justify evidentiary decisions. Retreating to fictional worlds helps stabilize the integrity of the system
of evidence rules over time and helps resolve the tension between
deeply held, but in practice often conflicting, values at the heart of
our system of evidence law.
The assumption in Roberts that hearsay meets constitutional
standards of reliability whenever it meets the requisites of a traditional exception is a good example of the stabilization function of pretend realities. Without this unreal assumption, the system of hearsay
exceptions that has been applied in criminal cases for generations
would come undone, and a predictable, low application cost system of
categorical exceptions would be replaced by a system in which the
admissibility of all hearsay offered by the state would be, in theory,
open to dispute before the judge. The received system in which the
reliability of hearsay that fits a categorized exception is disputable
only in front of the jury (or the judge as trier of fact in bench trials) is
part of American trial culture and appears to have worked no great or
systematic injustices. The Court in Roberts, although it may appear
blind to reality, was thus wise not to overturn the understandings of
generations. At the same time, the Court in Roberts wanted to ensure
that the Confrontation Clause barrier to hearsay evidence did not become a nullity, as it might have with the proliferation of new exceptions designed to make it easier to secure convictions in certain kinds
of cases, and with the availability of catch-all exceptions which, practically speaking, make all hearsay potentially admissible. Thus, the
Court in Roberts sought to ensure that the status quo would not
change with respect to accused criminals except where the change was
likely to enhance justice by yielding more true convictions-an outcome which appears likely to be fostered by the admission of reliable
hearsay. Yet, the Court could hardly write an opinion which held that
only in the case of novel hearsay exceptions did the Constitution demand some reason to believe that the hearsay offered against an accused criminal was reliable. Instead, and quite naturally, the Court in
Roberts presented the Confrontation Clause as a constitutional gatekeeper that let pass only hearsay that was likely to be reliable. But
the Court saw to it that this gatekeeper posed no barrier to the admission of hearsay under traditional exceptions by constructing a world
in which such hearsay was, without more, reliable.
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There are two kinds of inconsistencies a court can fall into. One
involves a conflict of doctrine or concepts that is internal to the legal
system. The other is an empirical inconsistency between what the law
asserts as fact and what actually is a fact in the external world. When
it is difficult to write an opinion without falling into one kind of inconsistency or the other, courts almost always opt for empirical rather
than conceptual inconsistencies. This is to be expected if evidence
law constitutes an autopoietic system, for autopoietic systems model
external systems in ways that allow for coherent system action. But it
is also explainable without regard to the theory of autopoiesis. Internal inconsistency may be demonstrated on the face of an opinion or
by contrasting one opinion or body of doctrine with another. While
assertions of inconsistency may be contestable, the contest can be
judged within the law-versed community. Moreover, the closest observers of courts, lawyers and law professors, are well schooled in
making conceptual and doctrinal critiques but rarely are experts in
making empirical ones, even when they possess on-point and convincing information. It is not surprising that courts try to avoid the
kind of inconsistencies their usual critics are best equipped to pounce
on.

Even when system stability is not a concern, courts locate evidentiary rules and rulings in fictional worlds because this allows them to
escape a value conflict that lies at the heart of the evidence system.
On the one hand, we want to resolve cases so as to get at the truth.
The creation and application of rules of evidence should, as a normative matter, facilitate this process. On the other hand, process matters. We will not allow torture no matter how effective it might be in
uncovering truth. More to the point, truth is supposed to be a product of fair process. Rules should be fairly read and applied neutrally.
Language should not change in meaning, depending on which side is
helped and whether that side's case is more likely to be true. Yet the
temptation to take outcome into account when interpreting what process requires can be overwhelming.
If an outcome orientation yields better decisions by the talisman
of truth, it should not necessarily be deplored. Some vague rules, like
the hearsay catch-all exceptions FRE 807, and its predecessors FRE
803(24) and FRE 804(b)(5), invite ends-oriented application. Thus
circumstances a court sees as sufficient, as a matter of fact, to guarantee reliability when a court believes hearsay will help a jury find the
truth may seem, again as a matter of fact, to be insufficient to guarantee reliability when a court believes the hearsay helps the party that
should lose. The situation is similar with respect to other facts that
condition the applicability of hearsay exceptions and other evidence
rules.
Consider, for example, the case which reached the Supreme
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Court as United States v. Salerno." In that case the trial judge held
that the defendant could not introduce transcripts of the testimony of
witnesses who testified before a grand jury under FRE 804(b)(1), the
exception for former testimony, because the government's motive in
cross-examining grand jury witnesses was not similar to the motive it
would have had in cross-examining the same witness at the defendant's trial.4 ' By itself, it is not clear whether the trial court created a
fictional world, for the court's analysis is not obviously wrong as a
matter of empirical fact.
We should not, however, consider Salerno by itself. Instead, we
should contrast it with the many decisions of courts at all levels holding that a defendant's motive to cross-examine government witnesses
at a Preliminary hearing is similar to the motive the defendant has at
trial. In the fictional world on which this proposition is based, all defendants want to thoroughly discredit government witnesses so that
they will not be bound over for trial, and a failure to cross-examine a
witness is an indication that the defendant regards the witness's story
as sound. But in the real world defendants and their attorneys know
that even an effective cross-examination at a preliminary hearing is
unlikely to lead to an immediate dismissal of the case. So the defendant's motive in deciding whether to examine a preliminary hearing
witness and in actually questioning that witness at a preliminary
hearing is often to secure discovery of the government's case or to
lock the witness into a story without revealing his own hand. Before a
grand jury, on the other hand, the government's goal is to secure an
indictment. It would seem that when a witness expected to give incriminatory testimony gives exonerative testimony instead, the government has an incentive to show the grand jury that the witness cannot be believed. Yet this is not what motivates government attorneys
before federal grand juries in the world the district court constructs so
as to deny the former testimony exception to Salerno. Indeed, the
government attorneys in Salerno saw cross-examination, that "greatest legal engine" for discovery of truth, as having little or no place in
the development of a witness' grand jury testimony when a witness'
truthfulness is doubted. And the trial court agreed.
By resting decisions in preliminary hearing and grand jury cases
41. 505 U.S. 317 (1992).
42. See id. at 320.
43. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970).
44. In an affidavit, the government argued that it had "'little or no incentive to conduct a thorough cross-examination of Grand Jury witnesses who appear who to be falsify-

ing their testimony to assist Grand Jury targets or other witnesses."'

United States v.

Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).

The trial judge

agreed that the government's motive to examine a grand jury witness is "'far different
from the motive of a prosecutor in conducting the trial."' Id. at 804.
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on fictive views of the motivations of prosecutors and defendants,
courts can apply the similar motive requirement of FRE 804(b)(1)in
ways that are conceptually faithful to the rule's language while admitting against defendants what the court believes is credible preliminary
hearing testimony likely to lead to justified convictions and denying
defendants the use of what the court believes is perjured grand jury
testimony, likely to lead to unjustified acquittals. Creating fictional
worlds thus allows courts to conform conceptually to the requisites of
FRE 804(b)(1) while also promoting the evidence law's overall aim of
getting at the truth. Other ways of biasing rulings in favor of the truth
are less attractive. A court could not, for example, hold that the
similar motive requirement of FRE 804(b)(1) is unimportant when
prior testimony is offered against an apparently guilty criminal defendant but matters greatly when an apparently guilty defendant offers
former testimony against the state. Such an open declaration of what
is going on is too obviously inconsistent with fundamental tenets of
fair procedure and formal adversarial equality to be a viable way of
tilting the balance at trial toward the party who the judge thinks has
truth on his side.
Conclusion
This piece is a preliminary inquiry into difficult issues, and my
conclusion is accordingly tentative. It is that evidence law responds
not to the real world but, as autopoietic theory postulates, to models
of the real world that the law constructs. These constructions, which
prop up both the system of evidence law and the way the rules of this
system are applied, are, to a not inconsiderable extent, fictionalized
portraits of the real world and the way people behave. Judges, whom
I have focused on, as well as lawyers and legislators who also contribute to evidentiary rule systems, are often informed observers of the
actual world and human behavior. In resting evidence law and its application on fictional worlds, they know what they are doing. Hence
it is not unfair to say that evidence law, both as doctrine and as applied, rests to a considerable extent on lies. It is hard to say whether
this is bad. We must consider the possibility that this reliance on fiction is not only understandable but perhaps, on balance, also an eminently serviceable response to dilemmas evidence law cannot avoid.
This paper does not, however, prove this proposition. Perhaps the
most obvious objection to this kind of perspective on judicial falsehoods is that judges do not necessarily know where the truth lies. The
fictive worlds they create to justify rulings that would be untenable in
the real world may reflect not an allegiance to the truth but systematic biases in favor of one party (in criminal cases, usually the state).
A second objection is that the costs that distorting reality creates for
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system legitimacy and predictability outweigh the virtues of skewing
discretionary decisions with an eye to the truth or of not abruptly
changing long-enduring aspects of evidence law. I shall not pursue
these issues here, but leave them to future work by me or by those
whom I hope find these preliminary thoughts intriguing.
Instead let me conclude by noting that if this analysis and the
conception of evidence law as an autopoietic system is in some measure correct, two recent developments may be contributing to what
some perceive as a coming crisis in the legitimacy and viability of our
current system of evidentiary procedure. The first development is
the increased empirical attention that is being devoted to evidentiary
rules, trials and the settings in which legal cases arise. It is relatively
easy for a court to create a fictional world to resolve tensions between
doctrine and justice when no one has the data to prove a court's world
is fiction. As scholars and lawyers armed with empirical data take a
more prominent place among court critics, however, courts may find
that lies about how the world works are a less viable way of maintaining conceptual and doctrinal consistency while still skewing decisions toward the truth.
The second development is the creation of the Evidence Rules
Advisory Committee, a body that not only is interested in rationalizing the rules of evidence and creating rules that better conform to the
conditions of the real world but also has a stake in change since a
posited need for change is its raison d'etre. Moreover, the Advisory
Committee is well-situated to integrate the findings of empirical research into rules of evidentiary procedure. The progressive rationalization of evidence rules based on better empirical knowledge may
seem like a good thing, but given the dilemmas that are arguably inherent in systems of evidentiary procedure, successive efforts to improve the system may succeed only in making it more complex and
may destroy some of the practical compromises by which evidence
rules mediate between the requisites of substantive and formal justice. Moreover, too frequent rule changes disrupt system stability.
Perhaps I am unduly pessimistic, but when I contemplate the Evidence Advisory Committee's efforts to whip the rules of evidence
into a more rational shape that better fits the world we live in, the image of Brer Rabbit trying to punch manners into the tar baby comes
to mind. So do Justice Jackson's cautionary words in Michelson v.
United States46 :
We concur in the general opinion of courts, text writers and the
profession that much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of
compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage
45.

See, e.g..

46.

335 U.S. 469 (1948).

MIRJAN R. DAMAgKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997).
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to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the
other. But somehow it has proved a workable even if clumsy system when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands of a
wise and strong trial court. To pull one misshapen stone out of the
balgrotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present
47
ance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.
At the least, evidence scholars today are living in interesting
times. This is the bright side. But then again, "May you live in interesting times" is a classic Chinese curse.

47. Id. at 486.

